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Kane's Savages.3 The books resembled similar literature about the Alaskan pipeline or the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge, sparking widespread outrage over oil development and prompting sympathetic efforts on behalf of aboriginal peoples threatened by the insatiable U.S. demand for oil.
Both Ecuador and Alaska witnessed American oil extraction in their hinterlands, volatile U.S. environmental politics, insistent native land claims, swift changes within native communities, nonnative colonization and missionary activity, environmental degradation of fragile lands, and American adventure tourism and reformist exposes. Because of the strong U.S. presence in both places, these developments are connected not only by parallel experiences of the sort noted in "comparative frontier" studies but also-and more importantly-by a direct lineage between earlier American Wests and later developments in both Alaska and northeastern Ecuador.4 Experiences like those of Ecuador with oil suggest that purely regional definitions of the "West"-definitions that demarcate a geographic area within U.S. national borders or within the trans-Mississippi regions of North America-cannot adequately frame studies of twentieth-century western history. The Ecuadorian story also lies partly within the domain of U.S. history and the grand narrative of the American West.5 When his- 5. Placing this Ecuadorian tale within the context of U.S. western history does not imply that Ecuador (or any other nation) should be viewed as simply a hinterland of the United States. Furthermore, other metropolitan centers haye torians concentrate exclusively on the modern American West, with its fixed boundaries, they risk losing sight of other central actors and processes. By the late nineteenth century, many American miners, missionaries, capitalists, travel writers, adventurers, diplomats, and soldiers had moved from the American West into new frontiers.6 To understand better the role of expansion and frontiers in American history, western historians need to set off in pursuit. This essay seeks to justify such a new departure and to provide a tentative map for the journey.
The "frontier" or "process" school provides a basic but incomplete guide for taking western history into the international arena. According to those who define the frontier according to processes of cultural, political, and economic interaction, the United States has seen a succession of "Wests" beginning with the eastern seaboard. Certain parallel processes have typified each one, as William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin outline in their recent essay, "Becoming West." The parallel processes include such characteristic changes as "species shifting," "market making," "land taking," "boundary setting," "state forming," and "self shaping."7 They differ from those described in Frederick Jackson Turner's famous thesis, abandoning his linear, ethnocentric, and romantic perspective for one that is more complex, indeterminate, and inclusive. Only during the nineteenth century did West-as-region and West-as-frontier clearly coincide when the trans-Mississippi West became the primary site for the interactive processes at the core of western history. Before and after, region and process fit imperfectly.
What renders this later version of the process school insimilar relationships with their hinterland areas. In this essay I privilege the American story to highlight the connection to the history of United States expansion. 6. On the long and somewhat messy history of the word "frontier" and for a consideration of the term's continuing utility, see 7. William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin, "Becoming West: Toward a New Meaning for Western History," in Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin, eds., Under an complete, however, is that it does not take into account U.S. international expansion in the twentieth century. The desire of Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin to ground western history in changing human relationships with nature leads them to locate these successive American Wests on the North American continent: "the continent itself has been both the principal object of human struggle and the stage on which that struggle has taken place."8 Their emphasis sharply limits our study of U.S. frontiers in the twentieth century, as Americans ostensibly ran out of land onto which to expand. Some western historians extend their analysis to Hawai'i and Alaska, but beyond these concessions, the process of "westering" supposedly ended, if not in the 1890s with the "closing" of the frontier, then sometime soon afterward.9 According to Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin, "The West as we know it today is not just a region; it is also the last frontier." Gradually, the West would "become a region not of moving on but of settling in." Or, as Cronon writes in another essay, the American West is a place that "changed in location for a while and then more or less settled down with more stable boundaries."10 Thus, the scholars who have emphasized the frontier as process confine that process to national borders and geographical contiguity. On reaching the twentieth century, they seem to jettison their central insight-that their story is about "part of the worldwide expansion of European economies and nation-states that traces back to the fourteenth century and before."11 They are well beyond the naive view that European and American expansion ceased in the 1890s or soon afterward, but they fail to acknowledge two twentieth-century "Wests"- The American role abroad extended beyond exports, however. One "tragedy" of Williams's Tragedy of American Diplomacy was that, while he opened the field of diplomatic history to a potentially wide range of interactions, he reduced diplomatic relations principally to the pursuit of markets. To be fair, Williams recognized the extensive range of American economic activities abroad, and his prolific writings provide many glimpses of the international economic "West." In Empire as a Way of Life, for example, Williams quoted President William Howard Taft's description of how the United States had moved beyond internal development: "our surplus energy is beginning to look beyond our own borders, throughout the world, to find opportunity for the profitable use of our surplus capital, foreign markets for our manufactures, foreign mines to be developed, foreign rivers to be turned into electric power and light." Yet Williams went on to emphasize Taft's "marketplace orientation" and quoted him on the government's obligation to "preserve to the American people that free opportunity in foreign markets which will soon be indispensable to our prosperity."25 In theory, "markets" could include trade and investment in raw-materials production and infrastructure development, as well as cultural exchange and interaction, but to Williams markets largely meant outlets for U.S. exports of grain and manufactures.
Those emulating Williams followed his lead, thereby leaving the links with the American West tenuous, or nonexistent, or lost in metaphorical comparisons of "expansion." Crapol, for example, has recently discussed the "dual traditions of colonialism and oceanic commercialism," implying that earlier continental expansion differed fundamentally from America's emerging overseas empire, which was largely based on trade.26 Moreover, the understandable diplomatic focus of foreign-relations historiography limits its access to western historians because of its attempt to tie economic, cultural, or environmental considerations to the U. Taking our cues from the process school of western history and the Wisconsin school of diplomatic history, we need a scholarly bond between the American West and U.S. international expansion that is as strong as the actual historical connection. There are two twentieth-century American "Wests," one a region located in the western United States and the other a shifting international economic, cultural, and political frontier. In a sense, these two "Wests" have been the dual fields The time has come for historians-especially western historians, whatever their proclivity-to acknowledge forthrightly and to study "westering" as it extended overseas. Many of the central concerns of western historians, including intercultural exchange, economic expansion, and environmental change, have increasingly occurred outside of the continental United States. By the early twentieth century (as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), the regional West was not the primary site for activities occurring along the far reaches of American society. By coming to terms with this change, students of the United States' international frontiers can explore the fundamental continuities, as well as the disjunctures, between the process of American expansion in the nineteenth century and that process in the twentieth century.
International overseas expansion seems to have differed in many significant ways from the continental expansion of the nineteenth century and earlier. In the twentieth century the United States never gained full political control of the areas that are discussed in this essay. For some western historians the lack of political control undermines any attempt to see a connection between U.S. activities abroad and the earlier continental frontiers. According to Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, frontiers between societies open in ambiguity and close with one of those societies achieving political dominance.
We regard a frontier... as a territory or zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct societies. Usually, one of the societies is indigenous to the region, or at least has occupied it for many generations; the other is intrusive. The frontier "opens" in a given zone when the first representatives of the intrusive society arrive; it "closes" when a single political authority has established hegemony over the zone.61
In a similar vein, Stephen Aron emphasizes the sequence of "conquest, colonization, and capitalist consolidation" as the essence of an American frontier, while Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin identify "boundary setting" and "state forming" as two of their six characteristics of the frontier process.62
Clearly, twentieth-century U.S. expansion differs from the earlier continental land-grabs involving native peoples or Mexico. Nonetheless, the refusal of the United States to establish political sovereignty over areas abroad (or its decision to relinquish such control, as with the Philippines) has not prevented Americans from powerfully asserting their presence-as they have, for example, in their interaction with the peoples of Ecuador. "Closure" need not mark a frontier-why does a frontier need an ending?-but intensive oil extraction in Ecuador has coincided with the definitive assertion of political authority by the national government of Ecuador over its Amazon territories. Native peoples who previously crossed freely over national borders are now incorporated within the nation; the is- suance of Ecuadorian identity cards to these people over the past twenty years symbolizes Ecuador's sovereignty. At the same time, the American presence through its petroleum entanglements suggests that western historians could study with profit how the experiences of Ecuador and similar areas resonate with life on earlier U.S. "Wests." For those who have been there, the muddy, oil-soaked streets of Ecuador's Amazon boomtowns resemble nothing so much as earlier western outposts.
More problematic than the absence of U.S. sovereignty is the lack of extensive American settlement and communitybuilding on these extracontinental frontiers. Most Americans overseas did not create agricultural communities, and hence the home-building processes that Cronon, Miles, and Gitlin discuss are generally not found. The missionary movement seldom sent "home missions" to newly settled communities, because few such communities existed. 
